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Abstract: In traditional reputation theory, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-
run  player.  In  “Bad  Reputation,”  Ely  and  Valimaki  give  an  example  in  which  reputation  is 
unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds, and 
presents a series of examples to illustrate when the bad reputation effect does and does not play a 
role. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that 
every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a 
chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of 
commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive 
results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg 
type  is  too  high,  the  relative  probability  of  the  Stackelberg  type  can  be  high  when  all 
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1. Introduction 
  A  long-run  player  playing  against  a  sequence  of  short-lived  opponents  can  build  a 
reputation for playing in a specific way and so obtain the benefits of commitment power. To 
model these “reputation effects,” the literature following Kreps and Wilson [1982] and Milgrom 
and Roberts [1982] has supposed that there is positive prior probability that the long-run player 
is a “commitment type” who always plays a specific strategy.
3 In “Bad Reputation,” Ely and 
Valimaki  [2003]  (henceforth  EV)  construct  an  example  in  which  introducing  a  particular 
commitment type hurts the long-run player.  When the game is played only once and there are no 
commitment  types,  the  unique  sequential  equilibrium  is  good  for  the  long-run  player.  This 
remains an equilibrium when the game is repeated without commitment types, regardless of the 
player’s discount factor. However, when a particular “bad” commitment type is introduced, the 
only Nash equilibria are “bad” for a patient long-run player.
4 
In the EV example, the short-run players’ only decision action is whether to “enter” (trust 
the long-run player) or stay out; if they stay out their payoff and the public signals are both 
independent of the long-run player’s strategy or type.  The essence of the EV example is that the 
short-run players choose to exit unless they anticipate a “friendly” action by the long-run player, 
and that the friendly actions have a positive probability of generating signals that suggest the 
long-run player is unfriendly. If the long-run player is patient, he may be tempted to change his 
play to avoid generating these “bad signals,” but the actions that reduce the probability of bad 
signals may themselves be unfriendly. 
The EV example is intriguing but it leaves open many questions about what conditions 
are needed for the bad reputation result. This paper extends the analysis of bad reputation in two 
important ways. First, EV consider only distributions with two types; we extend the analysis to 
general distributions over all “commitment types.” The bad-reputation result does not hold for all 
such distributions, but we show it does hold provided that the probability of the “Stackelberg 
                                                 
3 See Sorin [1999] for a recent survey of the reputation effects literature, and its relationship to the literature on 
merging of opinions. 
4 It is obvious that incomplete information about the long-run player’s type can be harmful when the long-run player 
is impatient, since incomplete information can be harmful in one-shot games. Fudenberg-Kreps [1987] argue that a 
better  measure  of  the  “power  of  reputation  effects”  is  to  hold  fixed  the  prior  distribution  over  the  reputation-
builder’s types, and compare the reputation-building scenario to one in which the reputation builder’s opponents do 
not observe how the reputation builder has played against other opponents. They discuss why reputation effects 
might be detrimental in the somewhat different setting of a large long-run player facing many simultaneous small,  
long- run, opponents.    2 
type” is sufficiently low.  This finding requires a very different method of analysis than in EV, as 
it requires keeping track of the relative probability of various commitment types. 
Second, this paper extends the ideas in EV to a more general class of games, allowing for 
multiple short-run (SR) players, multiple signals, many actions, more general payoff functions, 
and a more general signal structure. In particular the SR players can get signals of the payoffs of 
previous SR players, which may be important in applications. These extensions allow us to more 
clearly identify the properties that are needed for the bad reputation result. There are several such 
properties, notably that the short-run players can either individually or collectively choose to 
exit.  Also, the result requires that either exit is the minmax outcome for the long run player or 
that the signals of the long run player’s action have only two possible values; the EV example 
had both of these properties.  Games which satisfy our conditions are called bad reputation 
games, and we show that in these games any equilibrium payoff of a sufficiently patient long-run 
player is close to his value from exit. 
The main substantive assumption in this paper is that the actions and signals satisfy an 
extension  of  the  “friendly/unfriendly”  dichotomy  mentioned  above.  Loosely  speaking,  we 
require that there is a set of “friendly” actions that must receive sufficiently high probability in 
order to induce entry by the short-run players, a disjoint set of unfriendly actions, and a set of 
“bad signals” that are more likely under the unfriendly actions. Finally, each friendly action must  
be vulnerable to temptation, in the sense that some other action would decrease the probability of 
all of the bad signals and increase the probability of all other signals.  This condition is never 
satisfied by games of perfect monitoring, and our result gives only a very weak bound when 
monitoring is almost perfect. 
In addition to extending the applicability of the bad reputation result, these extensions 
allow us to better understand the demarcation between “bad” and “good” reputation. To further 
contribute  to  this  understanding,  we  provide  a  more  thorough  explanation  of  how  the  EV 
conclusions relate to past work on reputation effects.  Reputation effects are most powerful when 
the long-run player is very patient, and Fudenberg and Levine [1992] (FL) provided upper and 
lower bounds on the limiting values of the equilibrium payoff of the long-run player as that 
player’s discount factor tends to 1. The upper  bound corresponds to  the usual notion of the 
“Stackelberg payoff.” The lower bound, called the “generalized Stackelberg payoff,” weakens 
this notion to allow the short-run players to have incorrect beliefs about the long-run player’s 
strategy, so long as the beliefs are not disconfirmed by the information that the short-run players   3 
observe.  When the stage game is a one-shot simultaneous-move game, actions are observed, 
payoffs are generic, and commitment types have full support, these two bounds coincide,
5 so that 
the limit of the Nash equilibrium payoffs as the long-run player’s discount factor tends to one is 
the single point corresponding to the Stackelberg payoff.  For extensive-move stage games, with 
public outcomes corresponding to terminal nodes, the bounds can differ. However, although FL 
provided examples in which the lower bound is attained, in those examples the upper bound was 
attained as well, and we are not aware of past work that determines the range of possible limiting 
values for a fairly general class of games.  
We first present a number of examples to illustrate the results in the paper. 
Illustrative Examples 
The basic setting is that of a repeated game between a long-run player and one or more 
“dynasties” of short-run players. Play in each period’s stage game generates public signals that 
are observed by subsequent players.  
  We call the stage games participation games if they have the following extensive form.  
First,  the  short-run  players  simultaneously  decide  whether  to  exit  or  to  participate  in  an 
interaction with the long-run player.  The rules for relating the individual participation decisions 
to whether an interaction takes place can be arbitrary: individual short-run players may have veto 
power; either over exit or participation, or there can be majority rule, and so forth. If the short-
run players have chosen to exit, the stage game ends and the payoffs and the public signals are 
unaffected by any choice made by the long-run player (although they may depend on which exit 
actions  the short-run players selected.)  When  the short-run players participate, the  long-run 
player’s action potentially affects the payoffs of all players in the stage, and generates a public 
signal conveying information about the action choices of all players.  
The original EV example is a participation game: There is a single short-run player who 
is a motorist with a car in need of repair.  Participation means hiring the mechanic in which case 
the mechanic performs a diagnosis and makes a repair. The repair is publicly observed, but the 
diagnosis is not. More generally, even when entry occurs the short-run players need not perfectly 
observe the long-run player’s choice of action. Exit means choosing not to hire the mechanic; 
when this occurs future short-run players observe only this exit decision and not the repair that 
would have been chosen.   
                                                 
5 For this result there must be types that play certain mixed strategies.   4 
We identify conditions on the payoffs and information structure of participation games 
that  make  them  susceptible  to  bad  reputation;  we  call  these  “bad  reputation  games.”  Bad 
reputation games generalize the properties of the EV game but have application to stage games 
with quite different structure. Our results also reveal the boundary between games with good and 
bad reputations.   
 
EV WITH A STACKELBERG TYPE 
EV  assumed  that  there  were  just  two  types  of  mechanic:  rational  and  bad.  The  bad 
mechanic  always  replaces  the  engine,  whether  or  not  a  replacement  is  required.  The  bad 
reputation effect arises because the rational type distorts his choice of repairs in order to separate 
himself from the bad type.  On the other hand, traditional reputation arguments are built upon the 
assumption that the long-run player is potentially a Stackelberg type (the type committed to  
Figure 1: Distribution of Types 
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providing the best service.) It is therefore natural to investigate a model with a variety of types, 
including Stackelberg and other potentially good types. Our more general framework can extend 
EV to allow for general type distributions and our results imply that the bad reputation effect 
persists if the overall distribution of types satisfies the condition illustrated in Figure 1. 
In  Figure  1,  the  simplex  represents  the  set  of probability  distributions  over  the  three 
types, rational, bad, and Stackelberg.  In region A, the probability of the bad type is too high and 
the mechanic is never hired in any equilibrium.  On the other hand, we show that in region B, the 
probability of the Stackelberg type is high enough to ensure existence of a good equilibrium in 
which the rational type obtains his Stackelberg payoff.  The analysis is more interesting in the 
remaining region. We show that there is a curve whose shape is represented in the figure, such 
that  the  bad  reputation  effect  occurs  when  the  prior  falls  below  this  curve  (region  C).    As 
illustrated in the figure, the left boundary of the simplex is tangent to this curve as it approaches 
the lower left corner, where the long-run player is certain to be rational.  Thus, bad reputation 
holds for any generic perturbation of the complete information game. We discuss this issue at 
more length in Section 4.1. 
 
OBSERVING PAYOFFS 
  EV  assumed  that  the  short-run  players  observe  only  the  past  repairs  chosen  by  the 
mechanic, and receive no information about the success of the repair. Our results apply to a more 
general class of information structures: in particular we can allow motorists to observe not only 
past  repairs  but  also  information  about  their  success.    We  show  in  section  6  that  the  EV 
conclusion goes through unchanged when motorists observe an arbitrarily precise but imperfect 
signal of the realized payoffs of all previous motorists; the key is that observing the realized 
payoffs of the short-run players conveys only partial information about the stage-game action 
used by the long-run player. 
 
OBSERVING ACTIONS 
  Our bad-reputation result rules out games where the long-run player’s action is perfectly 
observed whenever entry occurs. This is immediate when the long-run player has a pure action 
which makes participation a best reply. In that case, a good equilibrium exists in which the long 
run player plays this action in the first period and separates from any bad types.  The more   6 
interesting case arises when only completely mixed actions induce entry.  The following is a 
typical example of such a game.  
 
 
  L  H  R 
E  0,4  1,3  0,0 
W  0,0  1,3  0,4 
N  0,1  0,0  0,1 
 
Figure 2: Corporate Fraud Game 
In this stage game the long-run player is an auditor who choose either to audit the East or West 
division of the short-run corporation, or not to audit (N). The short-run player chooses whether to 
hire the auditor (H) or take one of the exit actions (L,R).  Notice also that hiring the auditor is a 
best response only if the auditor places strictly positive probability on both E and W. 
  This  game is strategically similar  to EV and other bad  reputation  games:  the  auditor 
would like to be hired, but the corporation would not hire “bad” auditor who always audited one 
division, say E. In order to avoid such a bad reputation, the long-run player has an incentive to 
increase the probability of W, but this would also cause the short-run player to exit. Despite this 
similarity, we show that that this is not a bad-reputation game, and more strongly that the game 
does have an equilibrium where the long-run player obtains a good payoff. This shows that a key 
property  of  EV  and  other  bad  reputation  games  is  that  the  long-run  player’s  action  is  not 
perfectly observed even when participation occurs. 
We should also point out that adding an observed action to a bad reputation game can 
eliminate the bad-reputation effect. For example, in the EV game we might allow the mechanic 
give away  money  in addition to any  repair performed. If the  gift  is  large enough  to  induce 
participation  regardless  of  the  repair,  the  game  no  longer  satisfies  our  conditions  for  a  bad 
reputation game.  In fact there will be a good equilibrium in which in early stages the rational 
type pays to establish a good reputation and is eventually able to separate from any bad type. 
   7 
THE TEACHING-EVALUATION GAME 
  The following game illustrates both the extension to several short-run players in each 
period,  and  the  way  that  two  actions  by  the  long-run  player  can  lead  to  the  same  observed 
outcome even when entry occurs. Our definition of bad reputation games will accommodate both 
of these features.  
 In this game the short-run players are students, the long-run player is a teacher, and the 
signals are teaching evaluations. Each period, each short-run player decides whether to enter – 
that is, take the class – or not, and the class is taught regardless of how many students enter. The 
long run player has a pair of binary choices: he can either teach well or teach poorly, and he can 
either administer teaching evaluations honestly or manipulate them. The public signals are the 
evaluations. If the evaluations are administered honestly and the class is taught well, there is a 
high probability of a good evaluation, while if evaluations are administered honestly and the 
class is taught poorly, the probability of good evaluations is low. Manipulating the evaluations is 
certain to lead to a good evaluation, irrespective of the quality of teaching. Students only want ti 
to take the class if it will be taught well, and the teacher would rather teach well and have 
students than face an empty class, and it is too costly to manipulate the ratings to be worthwhile. 
So in the one-shot game with only the rational type, the rational type teaches well and does not 
manipulate the ratings. However, when there is a small probability that the instructor is a bad 
type who prefers to teach poorly and manipulate the ratings, this is a bad reputation game, so 
when the teacher is patient his payoff corresponds to no one taking the class. 
2. The Model 
2.1. The Dynamic Game 
  There are  ￿ ￿ ￿  player roles, filled by a long run-player L, and J dynasties of short-run 
players  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . The game begins at time  ￿ ￿ ￿  and is infinitely repeated.  Each period, 
players simultaneously choose actions from their action spaces. We denote the action space of 
the long-run player by ￿ and the action space of short-run player ￿ by 
i B , and assume that all 
action spaces are finite. A profile of actions for the short-run players is denoted b B Î . 
  The long-run player discounts the future with discount factor  ￿. Each short-run player 
plays only in one period, and is replaced by an identical short-run player in the next period. 
There is a set ￿ of types of long-run player. There are two sorts of types: type ￿ ￿ ￿ is called   8 
the “rational type,” and is the focus of our interest, with utility described below.  For each pure 
action  a A Î , type  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  is a “committed type” that is constrained to play  a. These are the only 
possible types in ￿.  The stage-game utility functions of the short-run players are  ￿ ￿ , and  ￿ ￿  
denotes the utility function of the long-run player of type  ￿ ￿ ￿ . The common prior distribution 
over types of the long-run player at time 0 is a probability measure denoted  ￿ ￿  We will not 
assume that every pure action commitment type necessarily has positive probability. 
  There is a finite public signal space ￿  with signal probabilities  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , given action 
profile  ( , ) a b . All players observe the history of the public signals. Short-run players observe 
only the history of the public signals, and in particular observe neither the past actions of the 
long-run player, nor of previous short-run players.
6 We let  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the public 
history through the end of period  ￿ . We denote the null history by  ￿ . We let  ￿
￿ ￿  denote the 
private history known only to the long-run player. This includes his own actions, and may or 
may not include the actions of the short-run players he has faced in the past.  
A  strategy  for  the  long-run  player  is  a  sequence  of  maps  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  where 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  is the set of mixed strategies over ￿; a strategy profile for the short-run players is a 
sequence of maps  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ;  ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  denotes the product of the  ￿ ￿ ’s (and not 
the convex hull of the product of the  ￿ ￿ ’s.)  Note that we write  ￿ ￿￿  for the profile of short-run 
player  strategies.  A  short-run  profile  b   is  a  Nash  response  to  a Î ￿   if 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for all short-run players i and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  We denote the set of 
short-run Nash responses to ￿  by  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .  
  Given strategy profiles  ￿ , the prior distribution over types  ￿ ￿  and a public history  ￿ ￿  
that has positive probability under  ￿ , we can calculate from  ￿ ￿  the conditional probability of 
long-run  player  actions,  denoted  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  given  the  public  history.  A  Nash  Equilibrium  is  a 
strategy profile ￿  such that for each positive probability history 
1)  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  [short-run players optimize] 
2)  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  [committed types play accordingly] 
3)  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is a best-response to  ￿ ￿￿  [rational type optimizes]. 
                                                 
6 We do not assume that the payoffs depend on the actions only through the signals, so the short-run players at date t 
are not necessarily able to infer the realized payoffs of the previous generations of short-run players. Fudenberg and 
Levine [1992] assumed that a player’s payoff was determined by his own action and the realized signal, but that 
assumption was not used in the analysis. The assumption is used in models with more than one long-run player to 
justify the restriction to public equilibria, but it is not needed here.   9 
2.2  The Ely-Valimaki Example 
In EV, the long-run player is a mechanic, her action is a map from the privately observed state of 
the customer' s car  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ E,T  to a choice of repair ￿ ￿ e,t .  Here E means the car needs a new 
engine, T means it needs a tune-up, e is the decision to replace the engine, and t is the decision to 
give the car a tune-up. Thus the long-run player’s action space is the set ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ee,et,te,tt , where 
the first component is the repair chosen in the state E. The one short-run player chooses an 
element of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ In,Out .   The public signal takes on the values  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ e,t,Out . If the short-
run player chooses Out the signal is Out regardless of the action of the long-run player, that is 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Out Out . Otherwise the signal is the repair chosen by the long-run player.  The two 
states  of  the  car  are  assumed  to  be  i.i.d.  and  equally  likely,  so 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ e et,In e te,In ,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ e ee,In , and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ e tt,In .  If  the  short-
run player chooses Out, each player gets utility 0. If he plays In and the long-run player’s repair 
is the correct one (that is, matches the state), the short-run player receives  ￿ ; otherwise, he 
receives   ￿ ￿ , where  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . The “rational type” of long-run player has exactly the same 
stage-game payoff function as the short run players. When the rational type is the only type in 
the model, there is an equilibrium where he chooses the correct repair, all short-run players enter, 
and the rational type' s payoff is ￿ .  When there is also a probability that the long-run player is a 
“bad type” who always plays ee, the long-run player' s payoff is bounded by an amount that 
converges to 0 as the discount factor goes to 1. 
2.3. Participation Games and Bad Reputation Games 
  As we indicated, we will study participation games in which the short-run players may 
choose not to participate. Bad reputation games are a subclass of participation games that have 
the additional features needed for the bad reputation result; the following is a brief summary of 
the  key  features  of  these  games.  First,  there  is  a  set  of  “friendly”  actions  that  must  receive 
sufficiently high probability to induce the short-run players to participate, such as et in the EV 
example. Next, there are “bad signals.” These are signals that are most likely to occur when 
“unfriendly” actions are played but also occur with positive probability when friendly actions are 
played.  In EV the bad signal is e.  Finally, there are some actions that are not friendly, but 
reduce the probability of the bad signals, such as tt in EV; we call these actions “temptations.” If 
there is a positive prior probability that the long-run player is a “bad type” that is committed to 
one of the unfriendly actions, then after histories with many bad signals the short-run players will   10 
become sufficiently convinced they are facing such a bad type and exit.  In order to avoid these 
histories the rational type of long-run player may choose to play one of the temptations, and  
foreseeing this, the short-run players will chose not to enter.   Our main result shows that this 
leads to a “bad reputation” result whenever the prior does not assign too much probability to 
types that are committed to play friendly actions.  
To model the option to not participate, we assume that certain public signals 
E y Y Î  are 
exit signals. Associated with these exit signals are exit profiles, which are pure action profiles 
Î Í e E B  for the short run players.  We refer to ￿ ￿ ￿  as the entry profiles.
7 
For each such ￿ ,  ( | , ) ( | ) y a e y e r r =  for all ￿ , and  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . In other words, if an 
exit profile is chosen, the distribution of signals is independent of the long-run player' s action, 
and  only  exit  signals  can  be  observed.    Moreover,  if  ￿ ￿ ￿   then  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   for  all 
￿ ￿ ￿ , so that an entry profile cannot give rise to an exit signal. Formally, a participation game 
is  a  game  in  which  ￿ ￿￿  and  moreover  there  is  some  ￿ ￿ a Î   with  ( ) R E a ¹ Æ ￿ .  The 
remainder of the paper specializes to participation games.  
We begin by distinguishing actions by the long-run player that encourage the short-run 
players to enter (friendly actions) and those that cause them to exit (unfriendly actions). In the 
EV example, the “honest” strategy et induces entry, and each of the other pure strategies induces 
exit.  The  appropriate  definitions  of  friendly  and  unfriendly  are  more  complex  in  our  more 
general setting for several reasons. First of all, in EV the friendly action is pure, but there are 
games with a single short-run player in which only mixed actions by the long-run player induce 
entry.  Second, in games with several short-run players, the set of exit profiles need not have a 
product structure, as for example when any player can unilaterally “veto” the participation of all 
of them. Similarly, the set of Nash responses typically does not have a product structure, as when 
(In, In) and (Out, Out) are both in  ( ) R a  but (In, Out) is not.   
Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ be the probability assigned to the set ￿ ￿ ￿  by ￿ . 
Definition 1: A non-empty finite set of pure actions F  for the long run player is friendly if there 
is a number  ￿ ￿ ￿  such that, for all  ￿ if  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some 
￿ ￿ ￿ . An unfriendly set  N corresponding to ￿  is any non-empty subset of  \ A F .  
                                                 
7 We allow for the possibility that there are several exit signals; this could correspond for example to the case where 
any short-run player can veto participation by all of them, and the identity of the vetoing player is observed.   11 
  This definition says that if the Nash response of the short-run players assigns positive 
probability to a non-exit profile, the probability given to some friendly action must be bounded 
below by  ￿ ￿ ￿ . Note that this is a necessary condition to induce entry, but it need not be 
sufficient. Conversely, if ￿  is a friendly set, then any pure action not in ￿  must cause the short-
run players to exit, hence the definition of an unfriendly set. Note that the definition requires that 
N  and F be disjoint; we discuss the reason for this in Section 4.3,
8 In the EV example the only 
friendly action is et, so the maximal unfriendly set is ￿ ￿ ee,tt,te .    
  For  any  action  to  be  played  in  equilibrium,  it  must  at  least  be  possible  to  design 
continuation payoffs that deter deviation to some action which improves the current payoff.  The 
following is therefore a necessary condition for a friendly action to induce entry in equilibrium.  
It is related to the notion of an action being identified, as in Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin 
[1994]. 
Definition 2: A mixed action ￿ for the long run player is enforceable (using actions that permit 
entry) if there does not exist another action  ￿ ￿ such that for all  ￿  such that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  . When  ￿ is not enforceable, we 
say that the action ￿ ￿ undermines ￿. 
Only enforceable friendly actions can induce entry in equilibrium. When entry occurs,  
rather than play an unenforceable action, the long run player would switch to the undermining  
action, thereby strictly increasing his current payoff while maintaining the same distribution over 
signals, and hence future payoff.  In the teaching-evaluations game described earlier, the action 
“teach well, manipulate” is unenforceable:  “teach poorly and manipulate” yields a higher stage 
game payoff and the same distribution over signals.   Hence the only enforceable friendly action 
in that game is “teach well, administer honestly.” 
Next we consider what signals may reveal about actions. 
Definition 3: A set of signals ￿
￿
is evidence for a set of actions  ￿  if  N is non-empty and 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for all  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ . 
                                                 
8 The maximal unfriendly set corresponding to a fixed F is  \ A F .  The reason that we do not simply define N  to 
equal  \ A F  is that this would make the other conditions for the bad-reputation result harder to satisfy.   12 
This is a strong condition: Every action in  ￿  must imply a higher probability for each 
signal in ￿
￿
 than any action not in  ￿ .  A given set of actions may not have signals that are 
evidence; in the case of the EV example, e is evidence for the unfriendly set ￿ ￿ ee .    
Definition 4: An action ￿  is vulnerable to temptation relative to a set of signals ￿
￿
if there exist 
numbers  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and an action ￿  such that 
1)  If ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ , then  ( | , ) ( | , ) r r r £ - ￿ ￿ y d b y a b . 
2)  If ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 then  ( | , ) (1 ) ( | , ) r r r ³ + ￿ y d b y a b . 
3)  For all ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The action ￿  is called a temptation. The largest parameters  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ for which  there is a d that 
satisfy 1) and 2) are the temptation bounds for action a. 
In other words, an action is vulnerable if it is possible to lower the probability of all of 
the signals in ￿
￿
 by at least ￿ while increasing the probability of each other signal by at least the 
multiple (1 ) r + ￿ . Notice that for an action to be vulnerable to a temptation, it must place at least 
weight ￿ on each signal in ￿
￿
.  Notice also that the definition does not restrict the payoff to the 
vulnerable action conditional on participation – the temptation here is not to increase the current 
payoff, but rather to decrease the probability of the signals in ￿
￿
.  
In the EV example, the friendly action et is enforceable but vulnerable relative to ￿ ￿ E . 
The temptation is tt, which sends the probability of the signal E to zero. (Since there is only one 
other  signal,  condition  2  of  the  definition  is  immediate.)    Section  5  considers  games  which 
satisfy the stronger assumption that the temptation leaves the relative probabilities of all signals 
in  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 unchanged. The latter assumption would be satisfied in any game with only two non-
exit signals. 
Definition 5: A participation game has exit minmax if  
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿









In other words, any exit strategy forces the long-run player to the minmax payoff, where the 
relevant notion of minmax incorporates the restriction that the action profile chosen by the short-  13 
run players must lie in the image of R.
9   It is convenient in this case to normalize the minmax 
payoff to 0. In participation games without exit minmax, there are outcomes that are even worse 
for the long-run player than obtaining a bad reputation.  In this case, not only is exit “not so bad” 
for the long-run player, but as we show in Section 4.4, there can be equilibria where the long-run 
player does better than the exit payoff.  Loosely speaking, in such games the long-run player can 
be deterred from his temptation to avoid exit by the threat of a stronger punishment.   
 
We are now in a position to define bad reputation games.   
Definition 6: A participation game is a bad reputation game if it has exit minmax,  and there is a 
friendly set  ￿  and corresponding non-empty unfriendly set  N and a set of signals ￿
￿
 that are 





 are called the bad signals.   
  In particular, the EV game is a bad reputation game. We take the friendly set to be ￿ ￿ et , 
the unfriendly set to be ￿ ￿ ee  and the unfriendly signals to be ￿ ￿ E . We have already observed 
that ￿ ￿ et  is a friendly set and ￿ ￿ ee  unfriendly. Moreover, ￿ ￿ E  is evidence for ￿ ￿ ee .     
  In  a  bad  reputation  game,  the  relevant  temptations  are  those  relative  to ￿
￿
.  For  the 
remainder of the paper when we examine a bad reputation game and refer to a temptation, we 
will always mean relative to the set ￿
￿
.  
  It is useful to define several constants describing bad reputation games. Recall that  ￿  is 
the bound in the definition of a friendly set.  Since the friendly set is finite, we may define 
￿ ￿ ￿  to be the minimum, taken over elements of the friendly set, of the temptation bounds  r , 
and  let ￿  be the minimum over the friendly set of the temptation bounds ￿ ￿.  Define 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ , 
                                                 
9  By the image of correspondence R  we mean the union over all  ￿ of the sets  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ .  In a participation game, the 
set  ( ) E image R Ç  is non-empty. When there is a single short-run player, the restriction  ( ) image R b Î  collapses to 
the constraint of not playing strictly dominated strategies, but when there are multiple short-run players it can 
involve additional restrictions.  It is clear that no sequential equilibrium could give the rational type a lower payoff 
than the minmax level defined in definition 5. Conversely, in complete-information games, any long-run player 
payoff above this level can be supported by a perfect public equilibrium if actions are identified and the public 
observations have a “product structure” (Fudenberg and Levine [1994]). This is true in particular when actions are 
publicly observed as shown in Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin [1990].    14 
where we take 1/0 = +¥. Since  N  and F  are non-empty and disjoint, r is finite, and since ￿
￿
 is 
evidence for  N ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ .    
In other words, ￿  measures how revealing the evidence is. Note that  ￿  is the minimum 
probability a friendly action must be played, while ￿ measures the amount by which a tempting 
action lowers the probability of bad signals.  This leads us to define the signal lag 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ , 
which is positive. To interpret it, suppose that a friendly action is supposed to be played with 
probability￿ ; the signal lag is a measure of how long it would take to learn that a temptation is 
actually being played instead.  It is also convenient to define 
￿ ￿
￿











3. The Theorem 
  We now prove our main result: In a bad reputation game with a sufficiently patient long-
run player and likely enough unfriendly types, in any Nash equilibrium, the long-run player gets 
approximately the exit payoff. The proof uses several Lemmas proven in the Appendix. 
  We begin by describing what it means for unfriendly types to be likely “enough.” Let 
￿￿ ￿ ￿  be the commitment types corresponding to actions in F. We will call these the friendly 
commitment  types.  Let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   be  the  unfriendly  commitment  types  corresponding  to  the 
unfriendly set ￿ .  Note that the sets  ￿￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  are disjoint. 
Definition 7: A bad reputation game with friendly set ￿  and unfriendly set ￿ has commitment 














￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
. 
 
This notion of commitment size places a bound on the prior probability of friendly commitment 
types that depends on the prior probability of the unfriendly types. Since ￿ is positive, the larger 
the prior probability of  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , the larger the probability of the friendly commitment types is 
allowed to be. The hypothesis that the priors have commitment size ￿ for sufficiently small ￿ is 
a  key  assumption  driving  our  main  results.  Notice  that  this  bound  can  be  rewritten  as   15 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so as  ￿ grows the probability of friendly commitment types 
must become lower.  
  Note that the assumption of a given commitment size does not place any restrictions on 
the relative probabilities of commitment types. In particular, let  ￿ ￿ be a fixed prior distribution 
over the commitment types, and consider priors of the form ￿￿ ￿, where the remaining probability 
is assigned to the rational type. Then the right-hand side of the inequality defining commitment 
size depends only on  ￿ ￿, and not on  ￿, while the left-hand side has the form  ￿￿ ￿. Hence for 
sufficiently small ￿ the assumption of commitment size  ￿ ￿ ￿ is satisfied for any f  Note that the 
EV  example  has  commitment  size  ￿  since  the  only  types  are  the  rational  type  and  the 
commitment type who plays ee .  
Define  ( ) , , max ( , ) min{0,min ( , )} L L L
a b a b U u a b u a b = - .  Let  ￿ ￿ be the maximum of the 
payoff of the rational type in any Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 1: In a bad reputation game if the commitment size is  ￿ ￿ ￿  ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ .  
Moreover  for any d   
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, 
where  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
is an upper bound on the number of consecutive  bad signals that can be observed before all 
subsequent short-run players choose exit.  
 
For the rest of this section, we fix an arbitrary Nash equilibrium. Given this equilibrium, for each 
positive probability public history  ￿ ￿ , let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote the expected continuation value to the 
rational long-run player, let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the posterior beliefs and actions of the short-run 
players,  and  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   be  the  action  of  the  rational  type  of  long-run  player.  If  ￿   has  positive 
probability under  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and ￿  positive probability under  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , then we define 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   16 
When mixed actions  ￿ and  ￿  put weight only on such  ￿ ￿ ￿ , it is convenient also to define 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  in the natural way. 
  The proof uses a series of lemmas whose proofs are in the appendix.  The first lemma 
says that when the prior on friendly types is sufficiently low, entry (and hence the realization of a 
bad  signal  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ )  can  occur  only  if  the  rational  type  is  playing  a  friendly  strategy  with 
appreciable probability. 
 
Lemma 1: In a participation game, if  ￿ ￿  is a positive probability history in which ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿  occurs 
in period ￿  and  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some friendly￿ . 
 
This  is  a  consequence  of  the  definition  of friendly  strategies:  entry  requires  that  the  overall 
strategy assigns some minimum probability to a friendly action, and if the friendly types are 
unlikely, then a non-negligible part of this probability must come from the play of the rational 
type. 
Lemma 2: In a bad reputation game, if  ￿ ￿  is a positive probability history, and the signals in  ￿ ￿  
all lie in  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, then 
a)  At most  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
of the signals are in ￿
￿
.   
b) If the commitment size is   ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
Remark:  The  intuition  for  part  a  is  simple,  and  closely  related  to  the  argument  about  the 
deterministic evolution of beliefs in FL: The short-run players exit if they think it is likely that 
entry will lead to the observation of a bad signal.  Hence each observation of a bad signal is a 
“surprise” that increases the posterior probability of the bad type by (at least) a fixed ratio greater 
than  1,  so  along  a  history  that  consists  of  only  bad  signals  and  exit  signals,  the  posterior 
probability of the bad type eventually gets high enough that all subsequent short-run players exit.   
This argument holds no matter what other types have positive probability, and it is the only part 
of this lemma that would be needed when there are only two types, one rational and one bad, as 
in EV.    17 
However, as we will show by example below (see Section 4.1), we cannot expect the 
“bad reputation” result to hold when there is sufficiently high probability of the Stackelberg type. 
Therefore,  part  b  of  the  lemma  provides  a  condition  on  the  prior  (expressed  in  terms  of 
commitment size) which ensures that the probability of the Stackelberg type remains low along  
any history which  consists only of exit outcomes and bad signals. This follows because  the 
friendly types are disjoint from the unfriendly types, and the bad signals are evidence for the 
unfriendly  actions,  so  every  observation  a  bad  signal  increases  the  relative  probability  of 
unfriendly types compared to any other commitment type.   




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿
￿ ￿  
￿
￿￿ ￿






￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿
￿ ￿  
and  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 
Lemma 3: In a participation game if  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , or  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for 
some vulnerable friendly action￿ with temptation bounds ￿,r ￿ , then  
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Remark: This lemma says that if the rational type is playing a friendly strategy, his payoff is 
bounded by a one-period gain and the continuation payoff conditional on a bad signal.  This 
follows from the assumption that for every entry-inducing strategy it is possible to lower the 
probability of all of the signals in ￿
￿
 by at least ￿ while increasing the probability of each other 
signal by at least the multiple ￿ ￿.  Because there is an exit minmax, the fact that the rational type 
chooses not to reduce the probability of the bad signal means that the continuation payoff after 
the bad signal cannot be much worse than the overall continuation payoff.  
 
Proof  of  Theorem  1:  Given  an  equilibrium,  we  begin  by  constructing  a  positive  probability 
sequence of histories beginning with an initial history at date 0. Given  ￿ ￿  already constructed, 
we define  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Recall that ￿  is the minimum over the friendly set of the temptation   18 
bounds  ￿ ￿.  We choose   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where we know  
that  ( ) t Y h  is not empty because either  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  or  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . This latter case implies 
that  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   for some friendly f , and since only enforceable actions can induce entry in 
equilibrium, this  f  must be vulnerable to temptation, so | ( ), ( )) | , ( )) 0 r a b gr b ( ³ ( >
￿ ￿
t t t Y h h Y f h .   
Since the history is a sequence of signals all of which lie in  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, we can apply 
Lemma  2  to  conclude  that  for  each  ￿ ￿   at  most  ￿ ￿   of  the  signals  are  in 
￿
￿
and ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .    Consider  an  t h   such  that  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  As  argued  above,  we 
know that  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some vulnerable friendly  f , so  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and Lemma 1 
implies that  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Now apply Lemma 3 to conclude that for each  ￿ ￿  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
Since  ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , it follows that for any history  ￿ ￿  the associated  ￿ ￿  are such that  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
"
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ . 
Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 at most  ￿ ￿  times, the right hand  
is largest in when all 
￿ ￿  of these times occurs at the start of the history. Substituting in the 




￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The fact that  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and that  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 at most  ￿ ￿  times now gives the desired bound.  
￿ 
4. Examples 
  To illustrate the scope of Theorem 1, and also the extent to which the assumptions are 
necessary as well as sufficient, we now formally examine the examples we presented in the 
introduction.  To  begin,  Example  4.1  illustrates  what  happens  when  the  commitment  size 
hypothesis  is  not  satisfied.  Example  4.2  shows  that  the  EV  conclusion  is  not  robust  to  the 
addition  of  an  observed  action  that  makes  the  short-run  players  want  to  enter.  Example  4.3 
examines participation games that are not bad reputation games, and example 4.4 illustrates the 
role  of  the  exit-minmax  assumption.    In  all  of  the  examples  but  4.1,  we  assume  that  the 
commitment size hypothesis is satisfied, and investigate whether the game is a bad reputation 
game.     19 
 4.1: EV With Stackelberg Type 
  One  way  that  we  relax  the  original  assumptions  of  EV  is  to  allow  for  positive 
probabilities  of  all  commitment  types.  In  particular,  we  allow  a  positive  probability  of  a 
“Stackelberg  type”  committed  to  the  honest  strategy  ￿￿ ,  which  is  the  optimal  commitment. 
However, a hypothesis of the theorem is that the prior satisfies the commitment size assumption.     
 It is immediate that the short run players refuse to enter regardless of the behavior of the 
rational type when the probability of the bad type is sufficiently high. This is the region labeled 
A in Figure 1. Bad reputation arises because the long-run player tries to prevent the posterior 
from moving into this region.  
When there is a sufficiently high probability of the Stackelberg type, the short-run players 
will enter regardless of the behavior of the rational type; this is region B in Figure 1.  Moreover, 
in this region, there is a Nash (and indeed sequential) equilibrium in which the long run player 
receives the best commitment payoff, which is “u ” in the notation of EV. The equilibrium is 
constructed as follows:  Consider the game in which the posterior probability of the bad type is 
zero. In this game there exists a sequential equilibrium in which the long-run player gets  ￿ . 
Suppose that we assume that this is the continuation payoff in the original game in any subform 
in which the long-run player played t at least once in the past. A sequential equilibrium of this 
modified  game  is  clearly  a  sequential  equilibrium  of  the  original  game,  and  by  standard 
arguments, this modified game has a sequential equilibrium. How much does the rational long-
run player get in this sequential equilibrium? One option is to play tt in the first period. Since the 
short-run player is entering regardless, this means that beginning in period 2 the rational type 
gets  ￿ .  In  the  first  period  he  gets  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Hence  in  equilibrium  he  gets  at  least 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , which converges to ￿  as  ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Our  theorem  is  about  the  set  of  equilibrium  payoffs  for  priors  outside  of  these  two 
regions.  The theorem states that there is a curve, whose shape is represented in Figure 1, such 
that when the prior falls below this curve (region C), the set of equilibrium payoffs for the long-
run player is bounded above by a value that approaches the minmax value as the discount factor 
converges to 1.   
4.2: Adding an Observed Action to EV 
  We now modify the EV game by giving the long-run player the option of “giving away 
money” in addition to performing a repair.  Giving money simply transfers a fixed amount of   20 
utility from the mechanic to the customer, independent of the outcome of the repair. We denote 
giving  money  by  g,  and  not  giving  by  n,  so  that  the  long-run  player’s  action  set  is  now 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ nee,net,nte,ntt,gee,get,gte,gtt ,  and  the  set  of  observed  outcomes  is 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ge,gt,ne,nt,Out .   
Suppose first that the gift is large enough that gtt induces participation; this implies that 
gtt  is in every friendly set.  Moreover, since the gift gives rise  to the signal ge for sure whenever 
the short-run player participates, it is not vulnerable to temptation with respect to any signals that 
are evidence for any other action, so this is not a bad reputation game.   Moreover, even without 
a  Stackelberg  type  the  EV  conclusion  fails  in  this  game:  there  is  an  equilibrium  where  the 
rational type plays gee in the first period. This reveals that he is the rational type, and there is 
entry in all subsequent periods, while playing anything else reveals him to be the bad type so that 
all subsequent short run players exit.   
On the other hand, if the gift is small enough that the only friendly actions are net and 
get, then the possibility of the gift does not matter, and this remains a bad reputation game.  As 
this shows, the assumption that every friendly action is vulnerable to temptation is important for 
the results and economically restrictive.  
Our  definition  of  a  bad  reputation  game  requires  that  the friendly  and  corresponding 
unfriendly sets are disjoint. There is a tension between this requirement and the requirement that 
friendly actions be vulnerable to temptation.  It is because of this tension that games in which the 
long-run player’s action is perfectly observed (conditional on entry) are never bad reputation 
games.  To illustrate this point, recall the auditing game:  
 
  L  H  R 
E  0,4  1,3  0,0 
W  0,0  1,3  0,4 




This game is a participation game where L and R by player 2 are exit actions and H is entry.  
Note that both E and W for player 1 cause exit, while mixing between the two actions with   21 
probability of E between ¼ and ¾ can induce entry Thus (E,W) is a friendly set, and N is 
unfriendly.   
  Suppose first that when the short-run player enters, the action of the long-run player is 
perfectly observed.  In this case, the bad signals are simply the unfriendly actions themselves.  
However, the game is not a bad reputation game for any choice of friendly and unfriendly sets.   
Proposition 1: Participation games in which, conditional on entry, the action of the long-run 
player is perfectly observed, are never bad reputation games. 
Proof:  If the game is a bad reputation game, it  must have a friendly set  F and non-empty 
unfriendly set  N , and a set of signals that is evidence for N, such that the enforceable friendly 
actions are vulnerable to temptation relative to ￿
￿
. Since the actions of the long-run player are 
observed, the only signals that are evidence for N are the signals corresponding to actions in the 
set  N . With observed actions, no action in F  gives rise to a bad signal with positive probability.  
But then no element of F  is vulnerable to temptation. 
￿  
 
Proposition 1 shows that games with observed actions do not satisfy the hypotheses of 
Theorem 1.  In fact, the conclusion typically fails as well, and even when the only commitment 
types are unfriendly types, there are equilibria (for d  close enough to 1) in which the long-run 
player obtains his best payoff in the game without commitment types.   
To see this, note that there are two possibilities when the action of the long run player is 
observed.  The first possibility is that there is at least one pure action  a of the long-run player 
that induces entry.  In this case, consider the following strategy profile.  The rational type of 
long-run player plays a in the first period and thereafter plays according to his best equilibrium 
of the complete information game.  Since  a is friendly, the short-run players will enter and the 
long-run player separates from the unfriendly types after one period.  Thereafter, the probability 
of  commitment  types  is  zero  and  hence  the  specified  continuation  profile  is  a  continuation 
equilibrium.  Finally, as d  approaches 1, the payoff of the long-run player approaches the best 
equilibrium payoff of the game without commitment types since he gets that amount beginning 
in period 2.   22 
The  second  possibility  is  that  the  only  entry-inducing  actions  are  non-degenerate 
probability distributions. In this case, in order to induce entry, the long-run player must play a 
mixed action that assigns positive probability to pure actions that are unfriendly.  We do not have 
a general result to offer here, but the game in figure 3 is the prototypical example of this case, 
and  the  following  argument  shows  that  the  conclusion  of  the  theorem  fails  for  this  game. 
Suppose that the only commitment type with positive probability is N, and that the probability of 
the  bad  type  is  less  than  ¼.  Consider  the  following  strategies:  For  any  current  probability 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  less than ¼ the rational type mixes so that the overall probability of N is exactly ¾. (In 
particular,  this  is  true  when  the  long-run  player  has  been  revealed  to  be  rational,  so  that 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .) The short-run player always enters. If E is observed, the type is revealed to be 
rational. If N is observed, the probability of the bad type increases by a factor of ￿ ￿ ￿, so when 
it first exceeds ¼ it is at most equal to 1/3. At this point, the rational type may reveal himself by 
playing E with probability 1, while preserving the incentive of the short-run player to enter.   It is 
easy to see that this is a Nash equilibrium for any discount factor of the long-run player, yet in 
this equilibrium, the long-run player' s payoff is 1.   
Next we consider games of almost-perfect monitoring, where all signals have positive 
probability  under  any  action,  but  where  if  entry  occurs  the  probability  of  the  signal 
corresponding to the long-run player’s action is at least ￿ ￿ ￿ .  In contrast to the argument above, 
these can these be bad reputation games, but there is a sense in which “good reputation” is 
nonetheless the right prediction here. To see this, let F be a friendly set, and N an associated 
unfriendly set; for small  ￿  the only signals that are evidence for N are those corresponding to 
actions in N. Since the friendly actions do generate bad signals, it is possible that there are 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  such that one of the friendly actions is vulnerable to a temptation, and in this case we 
have a bad reputation game. However, as  ￿  goes to 0,  ￿ ￿ goes to 0 as well, so for any fixed 
discount factor ￿ the payoff bound in Theorem 1 become vacuous.
10 
4.3:  Exit Minmax 
In participation games, reputation plays a role because the short run players will guard 
against unfriendly types by exiting.  This is “bad” for the long-run player only if exit is worse 
                                                 
10 We thank the referee for asking us about the impact of imperfect observability.   23 
than the payoff he otherwise would receive, and the exit minmax assumption ensures that this is 
the case.  
In participation games without exit minmax, there are outcomes that are even worse for 
the long-run player than obtaining a bad reputation.  In this case it is possible that there exist 
equilibria in which the long-run player is deterred from his temptation to avoid exit by the even 
stronger threat of a minmaxing punishment.  For example consider the game in Figure 4, where 
the  first  matrix  represents  the  payoffs,  and  the  second  represents  the  distribution  of  signals 
conditional on entry. 
 
  In  ￿ Out   ￿ Out       g  b  r 
F  1,1  0,0  -2,0    F  ½  ½  0 
U  1,0  0,1  -2,0    U  0  1  0 
T  1,0  0,0  -2,1    T  ½  0  ½ 
 
Figure 4 
This game is a participation game with exit actions  ￿ Out  and  ￿ Out , unfriendly action U and 
friendly action F vulnerable to temptation T.  There are only two types, the rational type and a 
bad type that plays U.  Exit minmax fails because the maximum exit payoff exceeds the minmax 
payoff, and we claim that there are good equilibria in this game because the threat of exiting with 
￿ Out  is worse than the fear of obtaining a reputation for playing U which would only lead to exit 
with  ￿ Out .   
To see this, consider the following strategy profile.  The rational type plays F at every 
history unless the signal  r  has appeared at least once; in that case the rational type plays T. The 
short run player plays  ￿ Out  if a signal of  r  has ever appeared. Otherwise, the short run player 
plays  ￿ Out  if the posterior probability of the bad type exceeds ½ and In if this probability is less 
than ½.  Observations of r are interpreted as signals that the long-run player is rational.   
Since  2 ( ) T,Out  is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the continuation play after a 
signal of ￿  is a sequential equilibrium.  When r  has not appeared, the long run player optimally 
plays F.  Playing U gives no short-run gain and hastens the onset of  ￿ Out , and playing T shifts   24 
probability from the bad signal b to the signal  r , which is even worse.
11   The short-run players 
are playing short-run best responses.  In this equilibrium, the long run player does not give in to 
the  temptation  to play  T.  As a result, with positive probability, the short-run players never 
become sufficiently pessimistic to begin exiting, and so the long run player achieves his best 
payoff. 
In the above example there were two exit actions.  The next proposition states that when 
there is only one exit action and the long-run player’s exit payoff is independent of his own 
action, the worst Nash equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game for the long run player is (not 
much worse than) his exit payoff.  Note that this condition is satisfied in the principal-agent 
applications discussed in section 5.  The proposition is a consequence of FL (1992). 
Proposition 3: Consider a participation game with a single short-run player and a unique exit 
action.  If 
   (i) there exists a pure action
12  ˆ a, such that  ˆ ( ) { } = R a exit , 
(ii) the prior distribution assigns positive probability to a type that is committed to  ˆ a, 
and 
  (iii) the long-run player’s action is identified conditional on entry  
then there is a lower bound on the payoffs to the rational type which converges to the exit payoff,  
as the discount factor approaches 1. 
Proof:  FL (1992) established
13 that for any game there exists a lower bound  ( ) d l  on the set of 
Nash equilibrium payoffs for the rational type, and that as  1 d ® ,  ( ) d l converges to a limit that 
is at least  
                                                 
11 Playing T gives probability ½ of shifting to the absorbing state where payoffs are –2.  Playing the equilibrium 
action of F has probability at most ½ of switching to the state where payoffs are 0. 
12 The assumption that this is a pure action is not necessary here; we state the result this way for consistency with the 
rest of the paper. 
 
13  The statement of the FL theorem requires that commitment types including mixing types have full support, in 
which case the set C  is the space of all (mixed) actions, but the proof given there also shows that the version of the 
lower bound given here is correct. 
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( ) max min ( , )
L
a C B a u b a b Î Î ￿  
where  ( ) ￿ B a is the set of self-confirmed best-responses to for the short-run player to  a, and C is 
the set of actions corresponding to the support of the prior distribution over commitment types. 
Because the long-run player’s action is identified conditional on entry and  ˆ ( ) { } = R a exit , we 
have  ˆ ( ) { } = ￿ B a exit , and because the type that plays  ˆ a has positive prior probability, the FL 
(1992) bound is at least  ˆ ( , ) u a exit .   
￿ 
 
For games satisfying the conditions of the proposition, the exit minmax condition is not 
necessary for bad reputation. The worst equilibrium continuation value that the short-run players 
could inflict is arbitrarily close to the exit payoff and hence a patient long run player could not be 
deterred from his temptation to avoid a bad reputation. 
5. Poor Reputation Games and Strong Temptations  
  Recall that an action is vulnerable to a temptation if conditional on participation by the 
short-run  players,  the  temptation  lowers  the  probability  of  all  bad  signals,  and  increases  the 
probability  of  all  others.    In  this  case  the  bad  reputation  result  requires  the  exit  minmax 
condition, as demonstrated by the example in Section 4.4. Notice, however, that in the example 
the relative probability of g and r is changed by the temptation. If the temptation satisfies the 
stronger property that the relative probability of the other signals remains constant, then we can 
weaken  the  assumption  of  exit  minmax.  In  this  section  we  develop  this  result,  and  give  an 
application to games with two actions.  
Define  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
 
This is a bound on the long-run player’s payoff when the short-run players play exit 
actions that are a best response to some (possibly incorrect) conjectures; it is this payoff (and not 
the  possibly  lower  minmax  payoff)  that  will  provide  a  bound  on  the  long-run  player’s 
equilibrium payoff under the assumptions of this section. 
Definition 3S: An action ￿  is vulnerable to a strong temptation relative to a set of signals ￿
￿
if 
there exists a number  ￿ ￿ ￿  and an action ￿  such that   26 
1) If ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿  then  ( | , ) ( | , ) y d b y a b r r r £ - ￿ ￿  
2)  If ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 then 
( | , ) ( | , )




y d b y a b
y d b y a b
. 
3)  For all ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
The action ￿ is called a strong temptation. 
  The first and third parts of this definition are the same as in the definition of a temptation; 
the  additional  strength  comes  from  part  (2),  which  requires  that  the  temptation  not  merely 
increase  the  probability  of  all  of  the  good  signals,  but  leave  their  relative  probabilities 
unchanged. Note that strong temptation is equivalent to temptation in games in which the set 
#￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 has a single element, for example games such as the EV example in which there 
are only two entry signals. In particular applies when the game of Section 4.4 is modified so that 
the only signals when entry occurs are g and r.     
This condition lets us prove an analog of  lemma 3:  
Lemma  3S:  In  a  participation  game,  if  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ or  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and  
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ for some friendly action ￿  that is vulnerable to a strong temptation  size ￿, then  
  ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 
where 
￿
￿ $ ￿ % $
￿￿ ￿




￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿
￿
















The proof, which is in the online supplemental materials (url : ) follows that of lemma 3, but 
takes advantage of the fact that the long-run player’s continuation expected value, conditional on   27 
a friendly action, a non-exit profile, and a signal not in  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, is the same for the equilibrium 
action and the strong temptation ￿ .  
Definition 6S: A participation game is a poor reputation game if it has exit minmax,  and there 
are friendly and unfriendly sets  F and  N and a set of signals ￿
￿
 that are evidence for￿ ,  such 
that every enforceable ￿ ￿ ￿  is vulnerable to strong temptation relative to ￿
￿
.    
The  next  result  says  that  poor  reputation  games  have  much  the  same  consequences  as  bad 
reputation games. 
Theorem 2: In a poor reputation game of commitment size ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, 
￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . 
With lemma 3S in hand, the proof of Theorem 2 is very close to that of Theorem 1, and is 
omitted.  Notice that it is possible for a game to be both a bad reputation game and a poor 
reputation game, and, since strong and ordinary temptation are equivalent when  #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 
is a singleton, the two are necessarily equivalent in this case. The original EV game is such an 
example. Notice also that example 4.4 in which we construct a non-bad equilibrium has three 
signals rather than two. With two signals, the game would still fail the exit minmax condition 
and fail to be a bad reputation game, but it would still be a poor reputation game, and would not 
admit  a  good  equilibrium.  Finally,  observe  the  proofs  of  both  Lemma  3  and  3S  can  be 
generalized, so that the difference between the best equilibrium payoff (in the limit as  ￿ ￿ ￿ ) 
and the most favorable outcome with exit is bounded by a scale factor times the product of two 
terms, namely (i) the change in relative probabilities induced by a temptation and (ii) the excess 
of  the  best  result  given  exit  over  the  minmax.  In  particular,  the  bound  on  the  difference  is 
continuous in the each of these terms, so that if either is small the best equilibrium payoff for a 
patient long-run player can only exceed the best exit payoff by a small amount.   
We turn now to the special case of two-player participation games where there is only 
one signal in ￿
￿
and short-run player payoffs depend only on the signal. We focus on the case 
where there is also one signal in  #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, so that bad reputation implies poor reputation. 
We show that these games are not poor reputation games (and by implication not bad reputation 
games either).   28 
Proposition 4: If a two-player participation game has only two “entry signals”  (that is two 
elements  of 
E Y Y - ),  the  short-run  player  has  only  two  actions,  and  the  short-run  player’s 
realized payoff is determined by the signal, then the game is not a poor reputation game. 
Proof: Notice that since the short-run player has only two actions, they correspond to “entry” and 
“exit” respectively. Consequently, the short-run player payoff conditional on entry depends only 
on the distribution over signals induced by the long-run player action. If we normalize the short-
run player’s payoff function so that his exit payoff is 0, and suppose that both the friendly and 
unfriendly sets are non-empty, then one signal yields a negative payoff and the other signal’s 
payoff is positive; call these the “bad” and “good” signals respectively. If the game has no non-
empty unfriendly set, it is not a poor reputation game; so we can suppose there is at least one 
non-empty unfriendly set. Any unfriendly set  ￿  consists of actions with a sufficiently high 
probability of sending the bad signal, and the bad signal (as a singleton set) is the only set ￿
￿
that 
can be evidence for ￿ . Let  ￿  be the friendly action in the (finite) friendly set that maximizes 
the short-run player' s payoff. The payoff to this action, conditional on it not generating the bad 
signal with the negative payoff, is positive, and since any temptation relative to ￿
￿
 must reduce 
the probability of the bad signal, a temptation must give the short-run player a higher payoff than 
this “friendliest” friendly action. For this to be true, there must be a pure strategy  " ￿  that gives 
the short-run player at least this same utility. Clearly  " ￿  induces entry, and since it is a pure 
strategy, it must be in the friendly set. This contradicts the fact that  ￿  was assumed to maximize 
short-run player utility in the friendly set. 
￿ 
We believe that the assumptions of this proposition imply that there is an equilibrium where the 
rational type' s payoff is bounded below by a positive number as  ￿ ￿ ￿  but we have not been 
able to show this. 
6. Principal-Agent Entry Games 
  In this class of games the only choice of the short-run player (the principal) is whether to 
enter or to exit.  We denote his utility by  ￿ ￿ . If the principal enters, then the long-run player (the 
agent) chooses a payoff-relevant action; otherwise both players receive a reservation value which   29 
is normalized to zero.  We assume there is an action ￿ ￿ ￿ for which  ( ) 0 ³
L u a , so that the exit 
minmax assumption is satisfied.
14 
For  these  games  we  can  immediately  identify  the  relevant  friendly  set,  which  is 
* { : ( ) } = Î ³ 0
S F a A u a .  To  show  that  these  are  bad  reputation  games,  it  suffices  to  find  an 
unfriendly set that is orthogonal to 
* F  and associated evidence, such that every enforceable 
point in ￿  is vulnerable to a temptation. 
We begin with the hidden information case.  Each period, nature draws a state  w Î W 
independently from a probability distribution that we denote by p.
15 We assume W is a finite set 
and that p is strictly positive.  The agent privately observes the state and then selects a decision 
d D Î . Conditional on the realized state and the decision of the agent, a signal  z Î  Z  is drawn 
from the distribution  ( | , ) m z d w  where we assume that  ( | , ) 0 m z d w >  for each  , , and  z d w .  
Future short run players observe both  z and the decision d .  Each player  j  has state-dependent 
utility function  ( , , )
j d z p w  and evaluates stage payoffs according to expected utility with respect 
to the distributions ( ) p w  and  ( | , ) m z d w . 
To apply Theorem 1, we find conditions under which this is a bad reputation game.  The 
set of actions for the long-run player is the set of maps  :W ® a D.  The stage-game utility 
function is  
( ) ( ) ( | , ) ( , ( ), )
j j
z Z
u a p m z d a z
w
w w p w w
ÎW Î
= ￿ ￿ . 
Finally 
E Y Y Z D - = ´  and 
{ : ( ) }






z d a entry p m z d  
Proposition  5: The hidden information game is a bad reputation game if there exists a decision 
d  such that  a Î
* F  implies Æ ¹ { : ( ) } w w = a d ¹  W. 
Proof:  Suppose there exists a decision d  such that  a Î
* F  implies Æ ¹ { : ( ) } w w = a d ¹  W. 
Let  ￿￿ ￿ ￿   denote  the  constant  action  that  chooses  ￿   regardless  of  the  state  ￿ ,  and  take 
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Clearly  
* ( ) a d F Ï , and hence ￿  is an unfriendly set.  Because  ( | , ) 0 m z d w >  for 
all  ￿ ￿ ￿ , the set of signals  { }
d Y Z d = ´  is evidence for  N .    
                                                 
14 This assumption will hold whenever the principal has the option to refuse to participate.  
15 This is a slight abuse of notation, as p also denotes the probability distribution over types in the incomplete-
information games, but no ambiguity should result.   30 
Let ￿ be any pure friendly action, then  { : ( ) } w w W = = ¹ Æ d a d , and also  \ d W W ¹ Æ .  
Let  " ￿  be the action that, regardless of w , assigns probability 0 to d  and equal probability to all 
other all decisions, and let ￿  be the action defined by  
￿￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $  and  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ .  
Since  \ d W W ¹ Æ, decisions are observable, and  ( | , ) 0 m z d w >  for all  ￿ ￿ ￿ , the friendly action 
a  produces  each  signal  in 
d Y   with  positive  probability.  On  the  other  hand,  ￿   reduces  the 
probability of signals  in 
d Y  to 0, and again since  ( | , ) m z d w  is bounded  away from  0,    ￿  
increases the probability of every signal not in 
d Y . Hence  ￿  is vulnerable to the temptation to 
play ￿ .  This establishes that the game is a bad reputation game.  
￿ 
For illustration, consider the following extension of the EV example.  If the correct repair 
is  chosen,  then  the  car  works,  otherwise  it  does  not,  and  future  motorists  observe  the  car’s 
performance.  Formally, let  { } Z = work,not .  Suppose that for each motorist (independently and 
with  equal  probability),  nature  selects  a  necessary  repair  from  the  set  { } tuneup,engine .  
Conditional  on  this,  the  mechanic  observes  state  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ tuneup,engine   representing  the 
mechanic’s diagnosis, and selects a repair  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ tuneup,engine .  Suppose with some small  
probability  ￿ ￿ ￿   that  ￿ is  incorrect,  that  is,  not  equal  to  the  needed  repair,  so  that 
( | , ) 0 m z d w >  for each  , , and  z d w .  We can now define the motorists’ payoff as a function of 
, , and  z d w  to yield expected payoff function  ( )
S u a  identical to the original EV stage-game 
payoffs.  Thus the friendly set (which is defined only in terms of the short-run player’s payoffs) 
from EV remains so, and we can apply Proposition 5 using the decision d = engine  to show that 
the  modified  game  is  a  bad  reputation  game.  However,  as  in  the  games  of  almost-perfect 
monitoring discussed in section 4.2, there is an order of limits issue here: As  ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿ ￿ ￿  as 
well, and for any fixed ￿ the payoff bound in the theorem becomes vacuous.
16 
In contrast to the hidden-action case, agency games with hidden actions tend not to be 
susceptible to bad reputation effects.  The problem is that the second part of the definition of 
temptation typically fails, because deviations will generally lower the probability of some good 
signals.  However, a special case in which a hidden-action game is a bad reputation game occurs 
when there is only one short-run player and only two non-exit signals, as in EV. The following 
proposition is an immediate application of the definition of a bad reputation game in this setting. 
                                                 
16 This is not a game of almost-perfect monitoring because the signal does not reveal any information about what the 
mechanic would have done if the diagnosis had been different.   31 
Proposition 6: Suppose in a principal-agent entry game that  { , }
E Y Y y y - =  and that ￿ ￿ strictly 
maximizes the probability of ￿  with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . If for every friendly enforceable ￿  there is a d 
such that  ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  , then the game is a bad reputation game. 
To apply this result, suppose that the agent chooses an action from a one-dimensional set ordered 
so  that  higher  actions  are  more  likely  to  give  rise  to  the  high  signal.    Specifically,  we  let 
{ ,..., } = Ì Â A a a , assume that  ( | ) y a r  is increasing function in a, and assume that  ( )
L u a  is 
concave, so that 
* F  is an interval.  Whether or not the game is a bad reputation game then 
depends on whether the principal prefers extreme or interior actions. 
To show how the bad-reputation logic can extend to game with several short-run players, 
we now consider games with multiple principals. In these “multilateral entry” games, the short-
run principals choose only whether to participate or exit.  If any short-run player chooses to exit, 
that player receives the reservation payoff of 0, but play between the agent and other principals is 
unaffected.  That  is,  { }
j B = exit,enter ,  and  the  unique  exit  profile  is  ( ) e º exit,...,exit .    The 
payoff of the short-run players who enter depends only on the action of the principal, and not on 
how many other short-run players chose to enter; to simplify notation we denote this “entry 
payoff” as  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  If all principals exit, the long-run player’s payoff is 0; if m of them choose to 
enter, the long-run player’s payoff is  ( , )
L u a m . We assume that the agent cannot be forced to 
participate, so that there exists an action 
1 a  such that for all m, 
1 ( , ) 0
L u a m ³ . 
  We do not require that  ( , )
L u a m  is linear in m, so this class of games includes those in 
which the agent has the opportunity to take a costly action prior to the entry decision of the short-
run players. Consider for example, a game in which the long-run player is an expert advisor, and 
the decision of the short-run player is whether or not to pay the long-run player for advice.  The 
advisor receives a report about the general desirability of various actions, and then meets with 
each  of  his  n  short-run  customers,  possibly  learning  about  their  individual  needs.    Here  the 
advisor receives the signal regardless of whether or not he is consulted by any particular short-
run player, and he may incur costs ahead of time for doing so. That is, the long-run player' s 
payoff may depend on his action even if the short-run players decline to participate. 
  We have the following obvious extension of Proposition 5.  
Proposition 7: Suppose in a multilateral entry game that  { , }
E L H Y Y y y - =  and that ￿ ￿ strictly 
maximizes the probability of  ￿ ￿  with  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . If for every friendly enforceable ￿  there is a ￿  
such that  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  the game is a bad reputation game.   32 
As an illustration, return to the example in which the short-run players are students, the 
long-run player a teacher, and the signals are teaching evaluations. We denote the public signals 
representing good and bad evaluations by  ￿ ￿  or poor,  ￿ ￿ . We assume specific payoffs: If the 
evaluations are administered honestly and the class is taught well, there is probability .9 of a 
good evaluation. If evaluations are  administered honestly and the class  is  taught poorly,  the 
probability of good evaluations is only .1. Manipulating the evaluations is certain to lead to a 
good evaluation.  All players get 0 if no students decide to take the class. For a short-run player 
who enters, the short run player' s payoffs are +1 for good teaching and -1 for bad. Let ￿  denote 
the number of students who take the class. The rational type of long-run player pays a cost of ￿  
to teach well; good evaluations are worth ￿￿ , while manipulating evaluations costs ￿￿ .  Hence 
in the one-shot game with only the rational type, the unique sequential equilibrium is for the 
rational type to teach well and not manipulate the evaluations, for an expected payoff of .8. 
However, when there is a small probability that the instructor is a bad type, and the 
instructor faces a sequence of short-run students, Proposition 7 applies.  To see this, we see that 
teaching  poorly  and  administering  the  evaluations  honestly  is  the  unfriendly  action  ￿ ￿ ￿ .  The 
friendly set consists of the pure actions “teach well, administer honest evaluations” and “teach 
well,  manipulate.”  As  we  pointed  out  earlier,  the  action  “teach  well,  manipulate”  is 
unenforceable,  so  the  only  enforceable  action  in  the  friendly  set  is  “teach  well,  administer 
honestly.”  This  admits  the  temptation  “teach  poorly,  manipulate.”  Here  the  short-run  player 
recognizes  that  if  the  long-run  player  chooses  not  to  send  the  signal  honestly,  he  loses  his 
incentive to teach well, and so there is no reason to enter. 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
  We have extended the EV bad reputation example to a broader class of games and prior 
distributions,  and  complemented  these  with  cases  where  bad  reputation  does  not  take  hold. 
Throughout  the  analysis,  we  have  maintained  the  structure  of  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [1989, 
[1992], with a single long-run player, whose type is fixed once and for all, building a reputation 
against a sequence of short-run opponents.  It would be interesting to explore bad reputation in 
other sorts of set-ups, such as the games with multiple long-run players studied by Schmidt 
[1993]  and  Celentani  et  al  [1996];  Morris  [2001]  analyzes  an  example  of  this  without 
commitment  types.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  study  the  extension  of  bad  reputation  to   33 
models  where  the  long-run  player’s  preferences  can  evolve  over  time,  as  in  Mailath  and 
Samuelson [2001].    34 
 
Appendix: Proofs 
Lemma  1:  If  ￿ ￿   is  a  positive  probability  history  in  which  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿   occurs  in  period  ￿   and 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some friendly￿ . 
Proof: Given  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  the short-run players'  profile has positive probability on a profile that does not 
exit. At such profiles  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some friendly  f . Since  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  we see 
that  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .   
￿ 
  We will let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  denote probability distributions over 
signals induced by the equilibrium strategies at history  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ; similarly  
! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  
denotes the equilibrium distribution on signals conditional on ￿  being in the set  ! ￿of types that 
are committed to actions in ￿ . The probability distribution on ￿  induced by a mixed profile ￿  
can be written as a convex combination of the conditional distributions  ￿ ￿￿ , which has support 
entirely in ￿ ￿ ￿ , and  ￿ ￿ , which has support entirely in ￿ . Then  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  induces 
the same distribution over ￿  as  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , where  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ . Although,  ￿ ￿￿  and 
￿ ￿  need not correspond to mixed strategy profiles (since they can have correlation), we may still 
write  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and  so  forth  for  the  expected  values  of 
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  with respect to the weights  ￿ ￿ , and similarly for ￿ ￿￿ . With that in 
mind, let  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  be the distribution of signals after history 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , given that the realization of the short-run players’ (equilibrium) action is an entry profile, 
and let  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  
Lemma 2: In a bad reputation game, if  ￿ ￿  is a positive probability history with respect to a 
Nash equilibrium, and the signals in  ￿ ￿  all lie in  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
 
a) At most  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  of the signals are in ￿
￿
.   
b) If the commitment size is  ￿ ￿ ￿  then ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .    35 
Proof:  First observe that if  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , then the short-run players  must exit in 
period ￿ , so  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . Thus if  ￿ ￿  is a positive probability history in which ￿ ￿ occurs in 
period ￿ ,  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , and   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  has positive probability of entry. Recall that  
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￿￿ ￿
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￿
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Substituting   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  
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shows that  
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿














Since signals in  ￿ ￿  convey no information about the long-run player' s type, it follows that if all 
signals lie in ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
, and signals in ￿
￿
 occur ￿  times, then    
   
  ￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
Hence if    
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￿ ￿
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then ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so in all subsequent periods the signal must be an exit signal. (Recall 
that in a bad reputation game,  1 r > ; this implies that the denominator above is not zero.) Again 
because  1 r > , it is sufficient that 
￿ ￿
￿ ￿












which is the condition in part a). 
We now turn to part b).  For any history ￿ on the equilibrium path at which entry occurs 
with positive probability, we must have  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some friendly  ￿ .  By assumption 
every enforceable friendly action is vulnerable to temptation, so that conditional on entry, the 
total probability of each bad signal  ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿  is at least  ￿￿  at such a history  h.  In particular, 
consider any history  ￿ ￿￿￿  after which a bad signal ￿ ￿ occurs.  Since bad signals are entry signals, 
entry must have had positive probability at  ￿ ￿￿￿ , and hence conditional on entry,  ￿ ￿ had total 
probability at least ￿￿ .  Bayes’ rule then implies  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for any type ￿ . 
Thus  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   for  each  t in  which  a  bad  signal  occurs.    In 
particular 
  ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   (1.1) 
where k  is the number of bad signals in  t h . 
  Bayes’ rule gives us the following inequalities 
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where the last inequality comes from the assumption that F  and  N  are disjoint. 
Divide the first inequality by the second and apply the definition of r  to get   37 
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for each  {1, , } t t Î ￿  such that  y Y t Î
￿
.  Since there are k  such t , we obtain  
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￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿











.  (1.2) 
Finally, we define k  by the following equation 











￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.  (1.3) 









































￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
& ’ ￿
￿ ￿ ( )
￿ ( ) * +
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
  (1.4) 
With these preliminaries in hand, we can conclude the proof.  First suppose that  
￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
















￿ ￿ ￿  
and we are done.  On the other hand, the opposite inequality implies by (1.2) and (1.3) that 
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￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ !
￿
￿ ￿  
and ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Lemma 3: In a participation game if  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ or  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  and  ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for 
some  vulnerable friendly action￿  with temptation bounds ￿,r ￿  then 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
Proof:  We need to calculate the long-run player payoff separately as a function of whether the 
short-run players exit or not. Using the  decomposition of the short-run players’ profile that we 
introduced before the proof of lemma 2,   we write 
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  First  assume  0 l ³   and  consider  the  value  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   conditional  on  exit.    By  exit 
minmax, this value is no more than  ( ) max ( , ) d Î t y Y h t v h y and thus from the definition of ￿  we can 
conclude that  
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . 
  If   ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  then  1 l =  and we are done with the first case in the statement.  
Now  consider  the  second  case  in  the  claim  of  the  lemma  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   and 
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  for some vulnerable friendly action￿  with temptation bounds ￿,r ￿ . In this case, 
1 l < . Let d be a temptation for  ￿ .  Since  ￿  is played in equilibrium, it earns at least as much as 
d, so that 
, - , -
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The expression  , - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  is non-positive because given exit, d  and f  induce 
the  same  distribution  over  signals,  and  hence  earn  identical  continuation  values,  and  by  the 
definition of a temptation,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , so that d does at least as well in the current 
period. Thus,  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .  Expanding this inequality and using the fact that 
( , ) ( , )
L L L





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿










  (1.5) 
Define 
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
. 
The inequality holds because continuation values for histories on the equilibrium path of a Nash 
equilibrium must exceed the minmax value, which we have normalized to zero.  We will use this 
fact  repeatedly  in  the  remainder  of  the  proof.    By  the  definition  of  a  temptation, 
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where the second inequality uses part 2 of the definition of a temptation.  We can now expand 
the definition of  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and bound it as follows. 
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where the last inequality follows because when  1 l < ,  ( ) t Y Y h Í
￿
(Recall that the vulnerability of 
f implies  | , ) 0 r( > ￿ y f b  for each y Y Î
￿ ￿  and each entry profile b.)  
This concludes the proof because if  0 l =  then  ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿  and if  (0,1) lÎ  
then  1 2 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ . 
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